Approximating Maximin Shares with Mixed Manna by Kulkarni, Rucha et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
09
13
3v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
7 J
ul 
20
20
Approximating Maximin Shares with Mixed Manna∗
Rucha Kulkarni†
ruchark2@illinois.edu
Ruta Mehta‡
rutameht@illinois.edu
Setareh Taki§
staki2@illinois.edu
Abstract
In this paper we initiate the study of fair allocations of a mixed manna under the popular
fairness notion of maximin share (MMS): allocate m indivisible items, goods/chores, among n
agents with additive valuations. A mixed manna allows an item to be a good for some agents
and chore for others, and hence strictly generalizes the well-studied goods (chores) only manna.
For the good manna, a remarkable result by Procaccia and Wang [PW14] showed non-existence
of MMS allocation. This prompted works on finding an α-MMS allocation, where every agent
gets at least α times her MMS value for α ∈ [0, 1]. A series of works obtained efficient algorithms,
improving the α factor to (∼3/4) for n ≥ 5 agents. Although computing an α-MMS allocation for
the best possible α, i.e., maximum α for which it exists, is known to be NP-hard, the question
of finding α-MMS for the near best α remains unresolved.
We make significant progress towards this question for mixed manna by showing a striking
dichotomy: We derive two conditions and show that the problem is tractable under these two
conditions, while dropping either renders the problem intractable. The two conditions are:
(i) number of agents is a constant, and (ii) for every agent, her total value for goods differs
significantly from her total value for chores.
First, for instances satisfying (i) and (ii) we design a PTAS – an efficient algorithm to find
(α − ǫ)-MMS allocation given ǫ > 0 for the best possible α. Second, we show that if either
condition is not satisfied then finding α-MMS for any α ∈ (0, 1] is NP-hard, even when solution
exists for α = 1. Our PTAS runs in time 2O(1/ǫ
2)poly(m) for a given ǫ, and therefore gives
polynomial run-time for ǫ as small as O(1/
√
logm).
As a corollary, our algorithm resolves the open question of designing a PTAS for the goods
only setting with constantly many agents (best known was α ∼= 3/4), and similarly also for
chores only setting. In terms of techniques, for the first time, we use market equilibrium as a
tool to solve an MMS problem, which may be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
Fair allocations of indivisible items is a fundamental problem that arises naturally in various
multi-agent systems [Ste48, BT96, VB02, Mou04, EPT07, Bud11, GHS+18], for example, seats
in schools/courses, spectrum allocation, air traffic management, computing resources on networks,
splitting assets and liabilities in partnership dissolution, and office tasks. Many of these involve
both goods that are freely disposable and chores that have to be assigned. In this paper we study
the fair division of a mixed manna: fairly divide a set M of discrete items, goods/chores, among a
set N of agents where each agent i ∈ N has an additive valuation function vi : 2M → R. We note
that a mixed manna allows an item to be a good (positively valued) for some agents, and a chore
(negatively valued) for others, and thereby strictly generalizes the extensively studied good (chore)
manna (see Section 6 for a discussion on related works).
Among various well-studied notions of fairness (see Section 6), maximin-share (MMS) is one of
the most popular notion (e.g., see [Bud11, KPW18, AMNS17, GHS+18, FGH+19, GT20]). Inspired
from the classical cut-and-choose mechanism1, the MMS value of agent i is the value she can
guarantee herself if she is to partition (cut)M into n = |N | bundles, given that she can choose the
last. Formally, if Πn(M) represents all possible partitions (A1, . . . , An) of M into n bundles,
MMSi = max
(A1,...,An)∈Πn(M)
min
k∈[n]
vi(Ak) .
The goal is to find an MMS allocation, i.e., an allocation where every agent gets at least her
MMS value. This problem has seen extensive work in case of a good (chore) only manna, while
no results are known for mixed manna. In this paper we initiate the study of finding an MMS
allocation of a mixed manna.
For the good manna, a notable result of Kurokawa et al. [KPW18] showed that an MMS
allocation may not always exist but α-MMS exists for α = 2/3, where every agent gets at least
α times her MMS value. This prompted works on efficient computation of an α-MMS allocation
for progressively better α ∈ [0, 1], namely [AMNS17, BKM17, GMT18] for α = 2/3, improved
to α = 3/4 by Ghodsi et al. [GHS+18]. And most recently, Garg and Taki improved this to
α = (3/4 + 1/(12n)) [GT20], and this is the best known for n ≥ 5 many agents. Similarly, for the
bad (chores) manna, starting from the work of Aziz et al. [ARSW17] for α = 1/2, a series of works
improved it to 9/11 [BKM17, HL19]. Note that with negative MMS values in this case, an α-MMS
allocation gives each i ∈ N at least 1α ∗ MMSi. On the other hand, the non-existence of α-MMS
allocation for good manna is known for α very close to 1 [KPW18]. This large gap naturally raises
the following problem:
Design an efficient algorithm to find an α-MMS allocation for the best possible α, i.e., the maximum
α ∈ [0, 1] for which it exists.
This exact problem in intractable: In case of identical agents, an α = 1-MMS allocation exists by
definition, however, finding one is known to be NP-hard for good manna [BL16].2 On the positive
side, a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) is known for this case due to [Woe97]. Given
a constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1], the algorithm finds a (1 − ǫ)-MMS allocation in polynomial time. No such
result is known when the agents are not identical. In light of these results, we ask,
1In case of divisible items and two agents, one agent cuts so that she is okay with both the bundles and the other
person chooses (mentioned in the Bible).
2Checking if a given instance admits an MMS allocation is known to be in NPNP, but not known to be in NP
[BL16].
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Question. Can we design a PTAS, namely an efficient algorithm to find (α− ǫ)-MMS allocation,
given ǫ > 0, for the best possible α?
In this paper we make a significant progress towards this question for mixed manna by showing
the following dichotomy result: We derive two conditions and show that the problem is tractable
under these two conditions, while dropping either renders the problem intractable. The two condi-
tions are: (i) number of agents n is a constant, and (ii) for every agent, her total value for goods
differs significantly from her total (absolute) value for chores, i.e., if these two values are v+i and
v−i then for a constant τ > 0, v
+
i ≥ (1 + τ)v−i or vice-versa.
First, for instances satisfying (i) and (ii), we design a PTAS (as defined above). Second, we
show that if either condition is not satisfied, then finding α-MMS for any α ∈ (0, 1] is NP-hard,
even when solution exists for α = 1. This hardness is striking because it shows inapproximability
for any non-trivial factor when either (i) or (ii) is not satisfied. This also indicates the necessity of
the two conditions for efficient computation of α-MMS allocation in mixed manna instances.
Our algorithm, in principle, gives a little more than a PTAS. It runs in time 2O(1/ǫ
2)poly(m) for
a given ǫ, and therefore gives polynomial run-time for ǫ as small as O(1/√logm), where m = |M|.
As a corollary, we settle the question of obtaining a PTAS for the good manna when the number
of agents is a constant. For this case, efficient algorithms are known for the following α values:
(3/4 + 1/12n) for n ≥ 5 [GT20], 4/5 for n = 4 [GHS+18], 8/9 for n = 3 [GM19], and 1 for n = 2
[BL16]. Similarly, for the chores only case as well, where the best known factor is 9/11 [HL19]. For
the reader’s convenience, in Table 1 we summarise the best known results including ours.
Mannas
n Identical agents n Non-identical agents
constant n non-constant n constant n non-constant n
Goods only PTAS [Woe97] PTAS (Corr. 3.2) 3/4 + 1/(12n) [GT20]
Chores only PTAS[AAWY98] PTAS (Corr. 3.3) 11/9[HL19]
Special Mixed PTAS (Algo.4,A) NP-Hard (Thm. 4.2) PTAS (Algo. 2) NP-Hard (Thm. 4.2)
General Mixed NP-Hard (Thm. 4.1)
Table 1: Summary of results. Every entry is the best known result for the α-MMS problem in the setting specified by
the column and row headers. The Special mixed manna has for every agent i ∈ N , max{v+i −v
−
i } ≥ (1+τ )min{v
+
i , v
−
i }
for a constant τ .
Next we give an overview of our approach to prove the results, and the techniques used.
1.1 Our Approach, and the Techniques Used
Let us first state the α-MMS problem for mixed manna. A mixed manna instance is represented
by (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), where the value of agent i ∈ N for set S of items is vi(S) = ∑j∈M vij . Since
vijs can be positive (goods) or negative (chores), the MMS value of an agent can be positive or
negative. In this case an α-MMS allocation for α ∈ [0, 1] is defined as:
(A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(M) s.t.∀i ∈ N , vi(Ai) ≥ αMMSi if MMSi ≥ 0, otherwise vi(Ai) ≥ 1
α
MMSi.
The problem is to find α-MMS allocation for the maximum possible value of α that renders
existence. We show both algorithmic and hardness results for this problem.
Hardness. We show a strong inapproximability result. Instances with identical agents, i.e., vi =
v, ∀i ∈ N , have an exact MMS allocation by definition. We show that, even for these instances,
finding α-MMS allocation for any α ∈ [0, 1] is NP-hard even if the instance in addition satisfies one
of the following two conditions (see Theorem 2.1).
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C1. n = |N | is a constant.
C2. For each i ∈ N , max{v+i , v−i } ≥ (1 + τ)min{v+i , v−i } where v+i and v−i are agent i’s total
(absolute) value of goods and chores respectively, and τ > 0 is a constant.
To show the above result we reduce the NP-complete PARTITION problem [GJ90] (for definition
see Section 4) to an instance (N ,M, v) with non-negative MMS value, such that MMS > 0 if and
only if the PARTITION problem has a solution. This proves inapproximability for any α ∈ (0, 1]
because MMS > 0 if and only if (α ∗ MMS) > 0. This result is in sharp contrast with good/bad
manna where simple greedy approaches give 1/2-MMS [AMNS17, ARSW17].
In light of the above hardness, we consider instances that satisfy both C1 and C2 for the algo-
rithmic result. For good manna with two identical agents, [BL16] showed that finding the exact
MMS-allocation is NP-hard (recall that it exists in case of identical agents). This implies that even
if both C1 and C2 hold, finding α-MMS for the best α ∈ [0, 1] is NP-hard. Therefore, we aim for a
PTAS (formal details are in Section 3).
1.1.1 PTAS assuming both C1 and C2
Our aim is to design a polynomial-time algorithm for the following problem.
OPT-α-MMS. Given an instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) (possibly with non-identical agents) that satisfies
C1 and C2, and an ǫ > 0, find an (α− ǫ)-MMS allocation for the best possible α.
Next we describe the high-level approach of our algorithm, the challenges it poses, and the
techniques used to resolve them. The first and foremost challenge posed by having chores is that
they are not free disposal. Hence they cannot be arbitrarily allocated once we have found a good
enough partial allocation.
Challenge 1: the best possible α is not known. All known algorithms for good/chore manna aim
for a particular α value. They are able to iteratively reduce to smaller instances by doing partial
allocations while maintaining existence of α-MMS for the reduced instance. Such an approach is not
applicable here. We resolve this by designing an algorithm to solve the following problem instead,
and then do binary search on the α value using it as a subroutine.
Sub-problem. Given α, either find an (α− ǫ)-MMS allocation, or correctly report that no α-MMS
allocation exists.
Our algorithm for the Sub-problem (Algorithm 2) performs the following high-level steps:
Step 1. Find µi = MMSi for each i ∈ N .
Step 2. Allocate the set of high (absolute) value items computed using µis.
Step 3. Allocate the remaining low (absolute) value items.
Challenge 2: unknown MMS values of the agents. To handle both goods and chores together, it
turns out that we must target the smallest possible value that we need to guarantee each agent.
This requires almost exact computation of their MMS values. The PTAS to find MMS values for
the goods only [Woe97] and chores only [AAWY98] cases do not translate to the mixed manna. As
the above hardness result shows, mixed manna is significantly different from these cases.
We resolve this by designing a PTAS for identical agents in Sections 5 and A for non-negative
and negative MMS values respectively. These are used in Step 1 of the algorithm to approximately
compute the MMS values of the agents.
3
Challenge 3: allocating arbitrarily high (absolute) valued items in Step 2. When there are only
goods, each high valued good can be given to any distinct agent, and both the agent and the good
can be removed to get a smaller instance – α-MMS allocation is not lost by this reduction [KPW18].
In case of only chore, the absolute value of every chore has to be smaller than the absolute MMS
value. But under the mixed manna, there could be very high-valued goods which when combined
only with the right set of high absolute valued chores (and vice-versa) ensure an α-MMS allocation.
Therefore, we cannot greedily allocate high-valued goods and reduce the instance.
We resolve this in Step 2 as follows: Let µi be the MMS value of agent i; µi can be positive,
zero or negative. Using the µis for all the agents, next we partitionM into a set of BIG and SMALL
items. For this, we first modify the instance so that every item is either a good or a chore for all
the agents. This partitions M into goods M+ and chores M−. Next we define BIG+ as the set of
j ∈ M+ such that some agent i has vij > ǫµin if µi ≥ 0, and BIG− as the set of j ∈ M− such that
some agent i has vij < −ǫ. Set BIG is BIG+ ∪ BIG− and items not in BIG are SMALL.
We show that |BIG| is a constant. This is not at all obvious. Since the MMS problem is scale
invariant (Lemma 2.3), wlog we assume that |vi(M)| = n. Then using conditions C1 and C2 we
show that v+i = O(1) = v
−
i . Then it follows that |BIG−| is a constant. Now if µi is big enough, then
it is easy to see that the number of BIG goods of agent i is a constant. But µi can be arbitrarily
small, i.e., O(1/m) for m = |M|. Yet, in Lemma 3.3 we show that no matter the value of µi, the
number of BIG goods of agent i is a constant, and therefore their union BIG+ has constantly many
goods (Corollary 3.1).
Using the fact that |BIG| is a constant we enumerate all possible allocations Bπ = (B1, . . . , Bn)
of BIG among n agents – again constantly many such Bπ since n is a constant. The next step is to
allocate SMALL items, given Bπ.
Challenge 4: allocating low valued items. In case of good manna, when items are low-valued,
previous works use bag-filling like approaches [GHS+18, GMT18, GT20], where iteratively, a bag is
greedily filled with items and given to the first agent who values it at least α times her MMS value.
Due to the greedy nature, enough value is left for the remaining agent after this allocation. Such
algorithms do not work for a mixed manna because there are also chores remaining to be allocated,
and it is not clear how to fill the bag so that α-MMS allocation is retained for the remaining agents.
This makes the α-MMS problem non-trivial even when all items have small absolute value.
We resolve this in Step 3 by designing a two-step process (details in Section 3.2):
Step 3a Assign SMALL goods on top of Bπ using market equilibrium: Given that agent i already
got Bi as per Bπ, we still need to give her ci = αµi − vi(Bi). Using this we design a
market with budget-additive utilities [BGHM17] with SMALL goods where every agent has
an additive (linear) valuation function vi and a cap ci on their utility. We note that goods
are considered divisible in the market. We show that, if Bπ is optimal (corresponds to an
α-MMS allocation) then any market equilibrium allocation gives value ci to each agent i. This
together with bundle Bi gives her αµi. Therefore, if this step fails to give α-MMS value to
every agent then we can safely discard Bπ.
The equilibrium allocation is fractional and needs be rounded. By proving that the equilib-
rium allocation can be made acyclic (Claim 3.1) we ensure that there are at most O(n) shared
goods. Using this we round the allocation so that no one losses by more than ǫµi and thereby
guarantee (α− ǫ)-MMS value to all at the end of this step (Lemma 3.5).
Step 3b Next we assign SMALL chores using envy graph: Repeatedly compute the envy graph on
agents with their current allocations, and make it cycle free. Then it allocates a small chore
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to any sink agent in the graph. This process works, because the sink agents have the following
property. As they do not envy any other agent and the total value for unallocated items is
negative, every sink agent values their own allocation at least vi(M)/n. Since vi(M)/n is
an upper bound on MMSi (Lemma 2.2), giving her a small chore still keeps her allocation
α-MMS valued (Lemma 3.6).
If Step 3a discards all Bπ then we know that α-MMS allocation does not exist for the given
α. Putting all the above steps together, we show in Theorem 3.1 that Algorithm 2 solves the Sub-
problem in time 2O(1/ǫ
2)O(m2) and therefore allows ǫ to be as small as O(1/
√
logm). Finally,
by doing binary search on α using Algorithm 2 as a subroutine, we can solve the OPT-α-MMS
problem in polynomial time (see Theorem 3.2). And we also get PTAS for good (bad) only manna
as corollaries (Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3). We note that, for the case of good (bad) manna the
algorithm becomes simpler since it does not need Step 3b (Step 3a).
Organization. In Section 2 we formally define the problem and some of it’s properties. In Section
3 we discuss our first main result, the PTAS (for non-identical agents). Section 4 shows the second
main result on the hardness of approximation. Sections 5 and A, discuss the PTAS for the identical
agents α-MMS problems for agents respectively with non-negative and negative MMS values. All
missing proofs, unless otherwise stated, are in Appendix B.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define mixed instances and other relevant notions of maximin share.
We also show how agents can be divided into two classes based on the sign of their maximin share
values, and this demarcation is crucial in the algorithms.
Notations. We use [k] to denote the set {1, 2 · · · , k}. For c ∈ R, c+ denotes max{c, 0}.
Definition 2.1. An MMS instance is a tuple (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), where N is a set of n agents,M is a
set of m indivisible items, and for each agent i ∈ N , vi : 2M → R is her additive valuation function,
represented by vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vij for S ⊆ M. If the agents have identical valuation functions, i.e.,
all the vis are same, then we denote the MMS instance by (N ,M, v).
The valuation functions allow every item to be negatively valued by some agents and positively
valued by some. We partition the items into three sets based on how agents value them as follows.
Goods are the items valued positively by all the agents. The set of goods is denoted byM+ = {j ∈
M | vij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N}. Chores are items valued negatively by all the agents, and the set of chores is
termed M− = {j ∈ M | vij ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N}. Mixed items are both positively and negatively valued
by the agents, and their set is denoted by Mgc = {j ∈ M | ∃i, k ∈ N , vij > 0, and vkj < 0}. Note
that, M =M+ ∪M− ∪Mgc. We call an instance pure if Mgc = ∅, and mixed otherwise.
A partition of all items among all agents is referred as an allocation, and denoted by Aπ =
{A1, A2, · · · , An}. Thus, Ai ∩Ai′ = ∅ for all distinct i, i′ in N , and ∪iAi =M.
Definition 2.2 (MMS value). Given an MMS instance, let Πn(M) be the set of all possible allo-
cations of M into n sets. Let Aπ = {A1, A2, . . . , An} be any allocation in Πn(M). The maximin
share (MMS) value of an agent i, denoted by MMSni (M), is defined as,
MMSni (M) = max
Api∈Πn(M)
min
Ak∈Api
vi(Ak) .
We refer to MMSni (M) by MMSi when the qualifiers n and M are clear, and by MMS when
agents have identical valuation functions. Note that MMSi can be negative too. In all discussion
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hence forth, we divide agents into two types based on whether their MMS values are negative or
not. This is important even to define the approximate notion of MMS. We prove that an agent’s
MMS value is negative only if the sum of her values for all items is negative. Hence, the sign of
any agent’s MMS value can be determined easily.
Lemma 2.1. vi(M) ≥ 0 iff MMSi ≥ 0.
Proof. If the sum of valuations of all items vi(M) is negative, there can be no allocation where
every bundle has non-negative valuation. Hence, MMSi is negative. If the sum of valuations is
positive, then adding all items to one bundle and no item in other bundles makes the least-valued
bundle have zero value. Thus, in this case, MMSi ≥ 0.
An allocation which gives every agent i a set of items worth at least MMSi is called an MMS
allocation. We define approximate MMS allocations as follows.
Definition 2.3 (α-MMS allocation). Aπ is called an α-MMS allocation for an α ∈ (0, 1], if for
each agent i ∈ N we have vi(Ai) ≥ αMMSi if MMSi ≥ 0, vi(Ai) ≥ (1/α)MMSi, if MMSi < 0.
Equivalently,
vi(Ai) ≥ min{αMMSi, (1/α)MMSi}.
Definition 2.4 (GENERAL α-MMS problem). Given an MMS instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), and a
number α ∈ (0, 1], the GENERAL α-MMS problem is to either find an α-MMS allocation of the
items M among the agents N , or correctly report that an α-MMS allocation does not exist for the
given instance.
Even for the goods only case (M− = Mgc = ∅), we know that an MMS allocation may not
exist [KPW18], and that checking existence is at least NP-hard even with two agents and is in the
2nd level of the polynomial-hierarchy (not known to be in NP). Therefore, the GENERAL α-MMS
problem is essentially intractable. To make the problem amenable to polynomial-time algorithms,
we make two assumptions. We discuss the (absolute) necessity of both of these assumptions in
Section 4 by proving hardness of finding α-MMS allocation for any α ∈ (0, 1] if either of these
assumptions are dropped. Formally, we prove the following result.
Theorem 2.1. Given an instance (N ,M, v) with identical agents and v(M) > 0 such that one
of the following two holds: either |N | = 2 or v(M+) ≥ (1 + τ)|v(M−)| for a constant τ . Finding
α-MMS allocation of (N ,M, v) for any α ∈ (0, 1] is NP-hard.
To prove the theorem, we show two reductions of the known NP-Hard problem PARTITION
to the GENERAL α-MMS problems where either |N | = 2 or v(M+) ≥ (1 + τ)|v(M−)|. Section
4 discusses the formal proof of this theorem. Theorem 2.1 motivate the following problem. Note
that, when agents are identical, Mgc = ∅, and therefore v(M+) and v(M−) are respectively every
agent’s total positive values and total negative values. To handle non-identical agents,
for each agent i ∈ N , define v+i =
∑
j∈M,vij≥0 vij and v
−
i =
∑
j∈M,vij<0 |vij |. (1)
Definition 2.5 (α-MMS problem). The α-MMS problem is the special case of the GENERAL α-MMS
problem where,
1. the number of agents n is constant, and
2. for some constant τ > 0, for every agent i ∈ N , either v+i ≥ (1 + τ)v−i or v−i ≥ (1 + τ)v+i .
Equivalently, max{v+i , v−i } ≥ (1 + τ)min{v+i , v−i }.
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As discussed in Section 1.1 α-MMS problem is NP-hard to solve exactly (due to [BL16]). We will
design a PTAS for the α-MMS problem in Sections 3 and 5. By PTAS we mean, in polynomial-time
it either returns an (α − ǫ)+-MMS allocation for a given constant ǫ > 0, or correctly reports that
no α-MMS allocation exists. Recall that by (α− ǫ)+ we mean max{(α− ǫ), 0}. Our final goal is to
solve the following α-MMS problem where α is not specified, and has to be maximized.
Definition 2.6 (OPT-α-MMS Problem.). Given an instance of the α-MMS problem, find an
α-MMS allocation for an α > 0 such that there is no α′-MMS allocation for any α′ > α for
the given instance.
It is easy to see that we can solve OPT-α-MMS (up to a small error) efficiently using the
polynomial-time algorithm for α-MMS by doing a binary search on the value of α.
The following simple observations will be useful in what follows.
Lemma 2.2. Given an MMS instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), MMSi ≤ vi(M)/|N | for all i ∈ N .
Proof. If MMSi > vi(M)/n, it implies that there exists a partition of items in Πn(M) where all
bundles have value greater than vi(M)/n. Therefore, vi(M) ≥ n.MMSi > n.vi(M)n = vi(M), which
is a contradiction.
Lemma 2.3. α-MMS problem is scale-free. That is, given an instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), we scale
each vi by some factor ci > 0 to get a new instance (N ,M, (vnewi )i∈N ) where vnewij = c · vij . Then
we will have
(i) MMSnewi = ci ·MMSi and
(ii) If Aπ is an α-MMS allocation for (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), then for (N ,M, (vnewi )i∈N ) too, Aπ is an
α-MMS allocation.
Lemma 2.3 was originally proved for good manna. We re-estate the proof and show that it also
works for mixed manna.
Proof. For any bundle S ⊆ M, we have vnewi (S) = c · vi(S). Therefore, MMSnewi ≥ ci · MMSi.
If MMSnewi > ci · MMSi, then we take a partition of items in Πn(M) that obtains MMSnewi and
re-scale the valuations back by 1/ci and we obtain a better MMSi for (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) which is a
contradiction. Therefore, MMSnewi = ci ·MMSi.
Further, vnewi (Ak) = ci · vi(Ak) ≥ ci · α ·MMSi = α ·MMSnewi ,∀Ak ∈ Aπ.
3 PTAS for α-MMS Problem with Non-identical Agents
In this section we obtain a PTAS for the OPT-α-MMS problem (Definition 2.6). For this we will
design a PTAS for the α-MMS problem and then do binary search to find the best α. We use the
results from Section 5 and Appendix A, that we have algorithms to find (1− ǫ2) approximate MMS
values of all agents (See lines 3 in Algorithm 1). We use these values to find an allocation that
gives every agent a bundle of value (α − ǫ2) times this approximate MMS value. Finally we will
combine the approximation factors to get an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation for the problem.
First we formally state the result we are aiming for. We then show how the problem instance
can be reduced to one that satisfies a number of nice properties – a pre-processing step. Then,
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by leveraging these nice properties we finally design the algorithm and discuss its correctness and
running-time. Recall the Problem Definition 2.5. Since this exact problem in intractable [BL16]
we aim for a PTAS. We will use n to denote |N | and m to denote |M|.
Theorem 3.1. Given an ǫ > 0, and an α-MMS problem instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) with α ∈ [0, 1],
there is an algorithm that runs in time f(n, 1ǫ2 )O(m
2) and outputs either
1. an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation, or
2. correctly outputs that an α-MMS allocation does not exist.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is constructive, and we discuss the algorithm shortly.
High-level Idea of the Algorithm. We will need the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Pure Instance). We call an instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) pure if Mgc = ∅. That is,
all agents agree on if an item is a good or a chore.
We first discuss why assuming that max{v+i , v−i } ≥ (1 + τ) ·min{v+i , v−i } helps.
Lemma 3.1. Given an instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) of the α-MMS problem with |vi(M)| = n for all
i ∈ N , the following holds.
Property∗: v+i = O(n) = v
−
i , ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. If v+i ≥ (1 + τ)v−i , we have v+i − v−i = n.
n = v+i − v−i ≥ (1 + τ)v−i − v−i ⇒ v−i ≤
n
τ
, and, n = v+i − v−i ≥ v+i −
v+i
1 + τ
⇒ v+i ≤
n(1 + τ)
τ
.
As n and τ are constant, v+i = O(n) = v
−
i .
Similarly, if v+i ≥ (1 + τ)v−i , we have v−i − v+i = n. By swapping v+i and v−i in the above
expressions, we have v+i = O(n) = v
−
i for this case too.
Lemma 2.3 shows we can assume the problem is scale-free, hence |vi(M)| = n is without loss of
generality. Using Property∗ we show that there can only be a constant number of goods valued at
least O(1/n) by any agent. Next, we note that it is without loss of generality to assume that every
mixed item, namely j ∈ Mgc, will be assigned to an agent who values it positively at an α-MMS
allocation. We therefore reduce the given instance to a pure instance by modifying the valuations so
that agents with negative values for the mixed items (items inMgc) now have zero value for them.
By modifying the valuations, we may lose the relation |v+i − v−i | ≥ τ ·min{v+i , v−i } for agents who
have higher value for their set of chores. However, we show that Property∗ still holds. We then
leverage Property∗ and the fact that the instance is pure crucially to get an efficient algorithm.
The algorithm uses tools such as market equilibrium, envy-cycle elimination and bag-filling, and
combines them carefully to obtain an allocation that gives every agent at least her (α− ǫ)+-MMS
share according to the old valuation functions.
In the next section we discuss the pre-processing of converting to a pure instance and compu-
tation of MMSi for every agent i ∈ N . In Section 3.2, we discuss the algorithm, and analyze it’s
correctness and running time.
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3.1 Pre-processing
The pre-processing algorithm, specified in Algorithm 1, takes as input an instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N )
of the α-MMS problem, and a constant γ ∈ [0, 1]. It has three steps. First, we normalize all
valuations so that the absolute sum of values for all items is n for every agent. That is, if v+i > v
−
i ,
scale the valuation function of agent i so that vi(M) = n, and scale to −n otherwise. Then, we
find the MMS values of all agents within accuracy factor γ. To do this, for each agent i ∈ N ,
we create an identical agents instance with n agents where the valuation function is vi. Then, we
find a (1 − γ)-MMS allocation using Algorithms 4 and 5. In the last step, we reduce the instance
to a pure instance by modifying the values for mixed items as uij = max{0, vij} for all j ∈ Mgc
and i ∈ N . The algorithm returns the (pure) instance with the modified valuations, and the set of
(1− γ)-approximate MMS values of the agents.
Algorithm 1: Pre processing Algorithm
Input : (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) of α-MMS problem, γ ∈ (0, 1]
Output: Pure instance (N ′,M′, (vi)′i∈N ), approximate MMS values within γ error
1 For all agents i ∈ N , normalize the valuations so that |vi(M)| = n
2 ui ← vi for all agents i ∈ N // valuation functions that will be returned
3 for i ∈ N // find (1− γ)-approximate MMS values using Algorithm 4 or 5
4 do
if MMSi ≥ 0 then
µ˜i ← Algorithm 4((N ,M, vi), γ)
5 else
µ˜i ← Algorithm 5((N ,M, vi), γ)
6 for all mixed items j ∈Mgc and agents i ∈ N do
if vij < 0 then
uij ← 0
7 return ((N ,M, (ui)i∈N ), {µ˜i | i ∈ N})
Next we show the guarantee from the pre-processing step that is crucial for the final algorithm.
Lemma 3.2. Given an instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) of α-MMS problem and γ ∈ (0.1], Algorithm 1
returns (N ,M, (ui)i∈N ) and {µ˜i | i ∈ N} that satisfy, ∀i ∈ N , u+i = O(n) = u−i and
if MMSi > 0, µ˜i ∈ [(1 − γ)MMSi,MMSi],
if MMSi = 0, µ˜i = 0,
if MMSi < 0, µ˜i ∈ [(1/(1 − γ))MMSi,MMSi].
(2)
Proof. By construction of ui we know that u+i ≤ v+i and u−i ≤ v−i . Therefore, using Lemma 3.1 it
follows that for each agent i, u+i = O(n) = u
−
i .
Next, note that if MMSi = 0, the PTAS of Section 5 will give the exact MMS allocation. Hence,
using Theorems 5.1 and A.1 for the µ˜i values returned, we have (2) for each agent i ∈ N .
3.2 The PTAS
We first define all notation and concepts, and provide intuition on how they are used.
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The Markets. The algorithm will solve the following market equilibrium problem as an interme-
diate step, to allocate small goods. The problem and a polynomial time algorithm for it have been
described in [BGHM17]. Briefly, the problem takes a set of buyers with budgets and utility cap
values, a set of divisible items available in one unit each, and valuation functions of the buyers for
the items. A market equilibrium is a set of prices for all items, and an allocation of all the items
among the buyers. The allocation is such that for every agent, the value of the bundle she has
received, if less than her utility cap, is the highest among all bundles that cost at most her budget.
Formally, the input to the problem, popularly known as a market with budget-additive utilities,
is a tuple (Bm,Gm, (vbi)i∈Bm , C), where Bm is a set of buyers, Gm is a set of divisible goods, (vbi)i∈Bm
are linear valuation functions vbi : S ⊆ M → R+ of all buyers, and C = {ci ∈ R+ | i ∈ Bm} are
utility caps of all agents. Every buyer has a budget of 1 dollar. As proved in [BGHM17], the market
equilibrium allocation is a solution of the following convex program. The variables are xij for all
i ∈ Bm, j ∈ Gm, where xij denotes the fraction of good j assigned to buyer i.
max
∑
i
log
∑
j
vbijxij
s.t.
∑
j
vbijxij ≤ ci, ∀i ∈ Bm
∑
i
xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Gm
xij ≥ 0, ∀i, j
(3)
The following two key properties of the market equilibrium allocation enable us to use it to
allocate the small goods. Consider the following undirected bipartite graph corresponding to every
market equilibrium allocation. The buyers and goods are the nodes in the two parts, and an edge
is drawn between buyer i and good j only if j has been allocated in non-zero amount to i, i.e.,
xij > 0. Call it the market equilibrium allocation graph. Then we can claim the following for every
such graph.
Claim 3.1. The market equilibrium allocation graph can be assumed to be a tree graph.
Proof-Idea of Claim 3.1. We know from [BGHM17] that all goods assigned to a buyer in a market
equilibrium allocation have the highest ratio of valuation to price, i.e., vij/pj . We use this to prove
that for every cycle in the graph, we can re-allocate the goods along the cycle and eliminate one
edge, without changing the utilities and money spent of any buyer and the money spent on and
amount sold of any good. That is, every allocation after removing one cycle, along with the same
set of prices, is also a market equilibrium.
A full proof of Claim 3.1 is provided in Appendix B for completeness.
Claim 3.2. There are at most n− 1 shared goods in the market equilibrium allocation graph.
Proof. Suppose there are k shared goods. Consider the subgraph of the market allocation graph
with the n+ k nodes corresponding to all the buyers and only the shared goods. From Claim 3.1,
we know this subgraph is acyclic. Hence, there are at most n + k − 1 edges. Further, each item
is shared, meaning there are at least two edges incident to each node representing a good. Thus,
there are at least 2k edges. The inequality n+ k − 1 ≥ 2k is satisfied only when k ≤ n− 1, hence
there are at most n− 1 shared goods.
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Intuitively, the market equilibrium allocation helps as follows. We divide the items into BIG
and SMALL (details below), and design a market problem with the SMALL goods, considered as
divisible here. The fractional market equilibrium allocation, over an optimal partition of the BIG
items, will prove to be an optimal α-MMS allocation, if an α-MMS allocation exists. As there are
at most n − 1 shared goods, after arbitrarily rounding off the allocation, every agent still has an
(α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation.
Envy Graph. This is a directed graph that captures the envy of agents for other agents’ allo-
cations. Each node in this graph represents an agent of the α-MMS problem. There is a directed
edge (i → k) corresponding to agents i and k if agent i values agent k’s allocation more than her
own. It is shown in [LMMS] that all cycles in an envy graph can be eliminated without reducing
the valuation of any agent. Intuitively, this is done by exchanging the bundles of agents along a
cycle, by giving each agent in the cycle the bundle of her successor, thereby making her happier.
This process is repeated until all cycles are eliminated.
The envy graph will be used to allocate the SMALL chores, after allocating all the SMALL
goods and rounding their allocation. The key idea is that until the value of the unallocated items
is negative, the sink agents of the graph will have large value for their current bundle, hence can
be given an additional SMALL chore.
Big/Small Items. Given an α-MMS instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), the algorithm first applies the
pre-processing subroutine with a particular γ. Let the pure instance returned by the algorithm
be (N ,M, (ui)i∈N ) and the approximate MMS values of the original instance be {µ˜i | i ∈ N}. In
order to get an error of ǫ in total, the algorithm will aim for an error of β ∈ (0, 1]. We fix
γ = β = ǫ2 .
The next definition classifies items as big or small using this parameter β.
Definition 3.2 (Big and Small items.). Any good that has value more than βµ˜i/n for some agent
i with µ˜i ≥ 0, or more than β/n for some agent with µ˜i < 0, is called a BIG good. The set of all
big goods, called BIG+, is,
BIG+ = {j ∈M+ | ∃i ∈ N : (µ˜i ≥ 0 and uij > βµ˜i/n) or (µ˜i < 0 and uij > β/n)}. (4)
Any chore that has absolute value more than β for some agent i is called a big chore. The set of
all big chores, called BIG−, is,
BIG− = {j ∈M− | ∃i ∈ N : |uij | > β}. (5)
The set of all big items, denoted by BIG, is BIG+ ∪ BIG−.
Any item that is not a big item, is called a small item. The sets of small goods, small chores,
and small items, are respectively termed and defined as SMALL+ = M+\BIG+, SMALL− =
M−\BIG−,SMALL = SMALL+ ∪ SMALL−.
Analogously, for each i ∈ N , BIG+i is the set of big goods for agent i, i.e., if µ˜i ≥ 0, BIG+i :=
{j ∈M+ | uij > βµ˜i/n}, and BIG+i = {j ∈M+ | uij > β/n}, otherwise. We similarly define BIG−i .
We abuse notation slightly by calling an item in BIG (or SMALL) a BIG (resp. SMALL) item.
The idea is to enumerate all partitions of BIG items, and design an approach that will allocate the
SMALL items optimally when given an optimal partition of BIG. If the value of µ˜i is big enough,
then it is easy to show that |BIG+| is constant. We next show that no matter how small µ˜i is,
|BIG+i | and |BIG−i | are constant for all i, after applying the pre-processing algorithm.
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After the pre-processing algorithm is applied, from Lemma 3.2, we have u+i = O(n) = u
−
i . We
use this to prove the next two lemmas. Hence forth, we sometimes refer to MMSi by µi for brevity.
The next Lemma will use a bag-filling algorithm 3 defined in Section 5. Briefly, Algorithm 3 takes
as input an MMS instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), and a partition of the BIG items, what are termed as
Big there, from M into |N | bundles, and an ǫ > 0. If the input satisfies certain conditions (one
of (11) or (12)), then the algorithm returns an allocation where every agent gets a bundle of value
(1− ǫ).
Lemma 3.3. For the instance returned by pre-processing algorithm (N ,M, (ui)i∈N ), the number
of big goods of every agent, i.e., |BIG+i | = O(n2/β).
Proof. First we show this when µ˜i ≥ 0.
If µ˜i ≥ 1/2, |BIG+i | ≤ |{j ∈M : uij > β/(2n)}| ≤
u+i
β/(2n)
=
2n
β
O(n) = O(n2/β). (6)
Otherwise, if µ˜i ∈ [0, 1/2), then from (2), µi < 1/(2(1 − γ)). Divide BIG+i into two sets as follows.
BIG+i = {j ∈M+ : uij ≥ β/(2n)} ∪ {j ∈M+ : βµ˜i/n < uij ≤ β/(2n)}. (7)
Let us call the first set in Equation (7) LARGE and the second set MEDIUM. Similarly as for the
case of µ˜i ≥ 1/2, we can prove the size of LARGE is O(n2/β), a constant. We now prove that the
number of items in MEDIUM is at most n(n−1)(1−γ)β + (n − 2). We prove that if this is not true then
there is a partition of all the items where all parts have value more than MMSi for agent i; in other
words, the MMS value of agent i is strictly larger than MMSi. The partition is as follows. Add all
items except the goods from MEDIUM to the first bundle. If i’s value for this bundle is more than
1, divide MEDIUM to make n − 1 bundles with at least n/((1 − γ)β) + 1 items in each. Then all
the remaining bundles too have value at least(
n
(1− γ)β + 1
)(
β
n
)
µ˜i >
µ˜i
(1− γ) ≥ µi.
If the value of the first bundle is less than 1 for i, then first add enough goods from MEDIUM to
this bundle so that its value is just above µi. As every item in MEDIUM has value at most β/(2n),
and µi < 1/(2(1 − γ)), the value of the first bundle is at most,
1
(2(1− γ)) +
β
2n
=
n+ β
2(1 − γ)n <
1
2(1− γ) =
1
2(1− ǫ/2) ≤
1
2− α ≤ 1, (8)
where we use γ = ǫ/2, and ǫ ≤ α ≤ 1 to get the last three inequalities.
Then the remaining total value of all goods is at least (n− 1). Consider an instance (N ,M, v)
with |N | = n − 1 identical agents, M is the set of unallocated items from MEDIUM, and v = ui.
There are no Big items. This instance satisfies condition set (11) of the bag-filling algorithm 3 as
follows. The total value of all items is n − 1, at least the number of agents. There are no Big
items, hence by default, the value from Big items in every bag from any partition of Big is 0 ≤ 1.
The value of every Small item is at most ǫ = β/(2n). Calling Bag-filling algorithm with the input
((N ,M, v), Bπ = [Bi | i ∈ N , Bi = ∅]) forms n − 1 bundles with value at least 1 − β/(2n). From
Equation (8), for γ ≤ 1/2, this value is strictly greater than 1/(2(1 − γ)) > µi.
Therefore, |MEDIUM| ≤ n(n−1)(1−γ)β + (n − 2) = O(n2/β). Hence |BIG+i | = |LARGE|+ |MEDIUM| =
O(n2/β), for any i with µ˜i ≥ 0.
If µ˜i < 0, ui(M) < 0. Then by the definition of a BIG good for this case, |BIG+i | ≤ u+i /(β/n) =
(n/β)O(n) = O(n2/β).
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Lemma 3.4. For the instance returned by pre-processing algorithm (N ,M, (ui)i∈N ), the number
of big chores of every agent i ∈ N , i.e., |BIG−i | = O(n/β).
Proof. By definition of a BIG chore, |BIG−i | ≤ u−i /β = O(n/β).
Corollary 3.1. For the instance returned by pre-processing algorithm (N ,M, (ui)i∈N ), the number
of big items, i.e., |BIG| = O(n3/β).
Proof. For every agent i ∈ N , |BIGi| = |BIG+i | + |BIG−i | = O(n2/β), from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4.
Then |BIG| ≤∑i |BIGi| = O(n ∗ n2/β) = O(n3/β).
Let Aπ∗ be an α-MMS allocation, and Bπ∗ be the partition of BIG items corresponding to Aπ∗.
Then as n is constant, Corollary 3.1 implies that we can find Bπ∗ in constant time.
We are now ready to discuss the main algorithm that uses all the notions defined above.
3.2.1 Algorithm
Algorithm 2 applies the pre-processing algorithm 1, and gets a pure instance (N ,M, (ui)i∈N ) and
a set of approximate MMS values {µ˜i}i. Every agent’s α-MMS value is defined as α (or 1/α) times
µ˜i for agents with positive (resp. negative) µ˜i. This gives us our target values. The algorithm now
enumerates all possible partitions Bπ of the BIG items (Line 11).
For each Bπ, it defines a market problem (Bm,Gm, (vbi)i∈Bm , C) (Line 12). Here the buyers are
the agents N , and the goods Gm are all SMALL goods, now considered divisible. The valuation func-
tions are the functions returned by the pre-processing algorithm, extended to fractional allocations
of the goods by interpolation. That is, for all i ∈ Bm,xi ∈ Rk where k = |Gm|, vbi(xi) =∑j uijxij .
The main parameters in the market definition are the utility caps of agents. The algorithm finds
the α-MMS value minus the value obtained from the BIG items for every agent. For all i, it sets the
utility cap ci as the maximum of this value and zero. Effectively, we include an agent as a buyer
in the market only if she has not received an α-MMS bundle from the BIG items. An equilibrium
of the above market is computed (Line 13).
Intuitively, if Bπ corresponds to an α-MMS allocation then there is an (integral) equilibrium
allocation in the market where every agent i gets a bundle of value ci (see proof of Lemma 3.5).
Therefore, if the equilibrium allocation does not give every agent a bundle of value ci, the algorithm
discards Bπ. Otherwise, the allocation is rounded off by assigning shared goods arbitrarily to any
buyer (Line 17). After rounding, any unallocated SMALL goods are arbitrarily allocated.
The next step assigns the remaining items, which are the SMALL chores. For this, the algorithm
constructs the envy graph (Line 26). It then repeatedly assigns any unallocated chore to any sink
agent and modifies the envy graph.
If any partition of BIG items Bπ, followed by allocating SMALL goods and chores as described,
results in an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation, the following last step is performed. Consider the original
valuation functions (vi)i∈N before the pre-processing step was applied. For every item j ∈ Mgc
according to (vi)i∈N , if it is allocated to some agent who values it negatively, re-allocate it to any
agent who has positive value for it. Return the allocation after all such re-allocations.
If an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation was not obtained for any partition Bπ, the algorithm reports
that no α-MMS allocation exists for the given instance.
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3.2.2 Analysis of Algorithm 2
We use Aπ∗ to denote an α-MMS allocation, and Bπ∗ for the corresponding partition of BIG items.
We first analyze the market phase of the algorithm. The following claim will be used to prove
a lower bound on the valuations of agents after the market phase.
Claim 3.3. If there is an α-MMS allocation for an instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), then for any in-
stance (N ,M′, (vi)i∈N ) obtained by removing a subset of chores, i.e., M′− ⊆ M−, and M′+ =
M+,M′gc = Mgc, there is an allocation which gives every agent a bundle of value αMMSi when
MMSi ≥ 0 (or (1/α)MMSi when MMSi < 0). Here MMSi is the MMS value of agent i for
(N ,M, (vi)i∈N ).
Proof. Let Aπ∗ = [A∗i ]i∈N be the α-MMS allocation for (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ). Then consider the alloca-
tion Aπ for the modified instance obtained by giving every agent i all the items in A∗i ∩M′. Every
agent values their bundle in Aπ at least as much as in Aπ∗, hence at least min{αMMSi, (1/α)MMSi}.
Let us call a bundle of items Ai given to agent i an (α− β)-MMS bundle, if ui(Ai) ≥ min{(α−
β)µ˜i, (1/(α− β))µ˜i}. An allocation where every agent gets an an (α− β)-MMS bundle is called an
(α− β)-MMS allocation.
Lemma 3.5. In Algorithm 2, if the partition of BIG items being considered is Bπ∗, then the
allocation Aπ obtained after solving the convex program of equation (3) and rounding the equilibrium
tree allocation arbitrarily is an (α− β)-MMS allocation.
Proof. The market equilibrium allocates all SMALL goods. All BIG items have already been allo-
cated, and only the (SMALL) chores are left unallocated after the market step. Therefore, from
Claim 3.3, if Bπ∗ is the partition of BIG items being examined, there must exist an integral allo-
cation of SMALL goods, and hence a fractional one too, that gives every agent an α-MMS bundle.
As µ˜i ≤ µi for all i, there is an allocation Aπ = [A1, . . . , An] that gives agent i a bundle of value at
least min{αµ˜i, (1/α)µ˜i} − ui(Ai). This value is the utility cap ci.
The highest value of the objective function of the market program (3) is reached when all
agents get a bundle of value equal to their utility caps ci. As such an allocation does exist,
solving the program will give a fractional assignment of SMALL goods that gives every agent a
min{αµ˜i, (1/α)µ˜i} valued bundle.
The market equilibrium allocation is rounded off arbitrarily. As each good is SMALL, every
agent values it at most βµ˜i/n if µ˜i ≥ 0, and at most β/n if µ˜i < 0. In the worst case, assume
an agent loses all her shared items in the rounding step. From Claim 3.2, she loses at most n − 1
items.
If µ˜i ≥ 0, her loss is at most (n − 1)(βµ˜i/n) < βµ˜i. After rounding the bundle received from
the market equilibrium, she still values her bundle at least αµ˜i − βµ˜i = (α− β)µ˜i.
If µ˜i < 0, then after scaling in repressing we have u(M) = −n. From Lemma2.2, µ˜i ≤ µi ≤ −1.
By losing all shared items, an agent’s loss is at most (n− 1)β/n ≤ β. She still receives a bundle of
value (1/α)µ˜i − β ≥ (1/α + β)µ˜i. As 1/α+ β ≤ 1/(α − β), ((1/α + β)µ˜i) ≥ (1/(α − β))µ˜i.
Next, we argue correctness of the envy cycle elimination step.
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Lemma 3.6. If Bπ∗ is the partition of BIG items being examined, after the rounding step of
Algorithm 2, every unallocated item can be allocated so that the resulting allocation is an (α − β)-
MMS allocation.
Proof. From Lemma 3.5, after rounding, every agent has an (α − β)-MMS bundle. Assigning any
goods that are unallocated after the market step arbitrarily still retains this property.
Consider any sink agent i of the (acyclic) envy graph. As i does not envy any other agent’s
bundle, her value for her own bundle is the highest. This is at least the average of her total valuation
for all assigned items. Until there is at least 1 unassigned chore, if µ˜i ≥ 0, each agent has value
strictly greater than n for all the assigned items. Hence i has value greater than 1 for her own
bundle. Otherwise if µ˜i < 0, i’s total value of all assigned items is greater than −n. Hence, her
value for her own bundle is greater than −1. Now every unassigned chore has value at most β for
any agent. After assigning any chore b ∈ SMALL− to i, her value for her resulting bundle is,
if µ˜i ≥ 0, ui(Ai ∪ {b}) ≥ 1− β ≥ (1− β)µ˜i ≥ (α− β)µ˜i,
if µ˜i < 0, ui(Ai ∪ {b}) ≥ −1− β ≥ (1 + β)µ˜i ≥ (1/α + β)µ˜i ≥ (1/(α − β))µ˜i.
This argument is true until there is at least one unallocated chore. Hence, the process of updating
the envy graph and allocating a chore to any sink agent can be repeated until all chores are allocated.
In the end, we still have an (α− β)-MMS allocation.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. When (α− ǫ) < 0, by definition 2.5, when agents with MMSi ≥ 0 receive
bundles of non-negative value, and those with MMSi < 0 receive bundles of value higher than −∞,
the allocation is an (α− ǫ)+-MMS bundle. Hence, by giving all items to one agent, the Algorithm
returns an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation.
For the case when (α−ǫ) ≥ 0, assume an α-MMS allocation Aπ∗ exists. Algorithm 2 enumerates
all partitions of BIG items, hence it considers Bπ∗, the partition corresponding to Aπ∗. In the
iteration when it considers Bπ∗, from Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, we get an (α− β)-MMS allocation Aπ∗
after assigning all items. After the last step of re-allocating items in Mgc, if given to agents who
value them negatively according to (vi)i∈N , we have that vi(Ai) ≥ ui(Ai).
Hence, if an α-MMS allocation exists, the algorithm returns an allocation with vi(Ai) ≥ (α−β)µ˜i
if µ˜i ≥ 0, and vi(Ai) ≥ (1/(α − β))µ˜i if µ˜i < 0.
To ensure this is an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation, we want
(α− β)µ˜i ≥ (α− ǫ)µi, when µ˜i ≥ 0,
(1/(α − β))µ˜i ≥ (1/(α − ǫ))µi, when µ˜i < 0.
Simplifying these equations using Equation (2), we get,
µ˜i ≥ 0 : (α− β)µ˜i ≥ (α− β)(1 − γ)µi
⇒ we want: (α− β)(1− γ) ≥ (α− ǫ). (9)
µ˜i < 0 :
1
(α− β) µ˜i ≥
1
(α− β)(1− γ)µi
⇒ we want: (α− ǫ) ≤ (α− β)(1 − γ).
(10)
Both in (9) and (10) we want (α− β)(1 − γ) ≥ (α− ǫ). Replacing β = γ = ǫ2 , we get
(α− β)(1 − γ) = (α− ǫ2 )(1− ǫ2) = α− α ǫ2 − ǫ2 + ( ǫ2 )2 ≥ α− ǫ2 − ǫ2 = (α− ǫ)
where the inequality follows since α ≤ 1.
If an α-MMS allocation exists, an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation always does, and is given as output.
Hence, if an (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation is not given, then an α-MMS allocation does not exist, as is
correctly reported. Thus, Algorithm 2 gives a (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation, else correctly reports that
an α-MMS allocation does not exist.
Let us finally look at the running time of Algorithm 2. First, the pre-processing step calls
the PTAS for identical agents (from Section 5 and Appendix A) n times, hence from the proofs of
Theorem 5.1 and A.1, requires O(21/ǫnm+21/ǫ
2
n2 logm) time. Next, the main for loop enumerating
all partitions of BIG runs for |BIG| iterations. From Corollary 3.1, this is nO(n3/ǫ). In each iteration,
the market equilibrium, from [BGHM17], requires O(mn6 log(m+n)) time. From [LMMS], the time
to compute an acyclic envy graph is O(mn3). For each partition of BIG items, there are O(|SMALL|)
envy graph computations. Thus, in the worst case, the envy graph phase takes O(m2n3) time.
Finally, looking at all items in Mgc and re-assigning if necessary takes a further O(m) time.
Together, every iteration of the main for loop takes O(mn6 log(m + n) +m2n3) time. Hence, the
total time for the algorithm is O(21/ǫnm+21/ǫ
2
n2 logm)+O(2O(n
3 logn/ǫ)(mn6 log(m+n)+m2n3)),
which is,
2O(logn/ǫ
2)O(logm) + 2O(n
3 logn/ǫ)O(m2) = f(n,
1
ǫ2
)O(m2).
As discussed in Section 2, a binary search for the highest α can be done using the algorithm,
which leads to a PTAS for OPT-α-MMS.
Theorem 3.2. There is a PTAS for the OPT-α-MMS problem.
Proof. For any α∗ ∈ (0, 1], the PTAS for the α-MMS problem can check if an α∗-MMS allocation
exists, and if it does not then we know that the maximum possible α is less than α∗. Hence, a binary
search on the value of α, where for each value we run the PTAS, suffices to solve the OPT-α-MMS
problem.
As corollaries of Theorem 3.2, we get the following results for the only goods and only chores
settings.
Corollary 3.2. There is a PTAS for the problem of finding the best approximate MMS allocation
when distributing goods among a constant number of agents.
Corollary 3.3. There is a PTAS for the problem of finding the best approximate MMS allocation
when distributing chores among a constant number of agents.
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Algorithm 2: (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation of mixed items to non-identical agents
Input : Instance (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ) of α-MMS problem, α ∈ (0, 1], and ǫ > 0
Output: (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation or report α-MMS allocation does not exist
1 if ǫ ≤ α // all items to one agent is (α− ǫ)+-MMS allocation
2 then
3 if there is some agent i with vi(M) ≥ 0 then
4 Ai ←M; Ak ← ∅ ∀k 6= i
5 else
6 A1 ←M; Ak ← ∅ ∀k 6= 1
7 return Aπ = [A1, A2, · · · , An]
8 Fix γ = β = ǫ2 // to get ≤ ǫ error overall.See Eq.(9) and (10)
9 ((N ,M, (ui)i∈N ), {µ˜i | i ∈ N})← Preprocessing((N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), γ) // Algorithm 1
10 Define BIG+,BIG−,SMALL+ and SMALL− as in Definition 3.2
11 for all allocations Bπ = [B1, B2 . . . , Bn] of BIG do
12 Define a market (Bm,Gm, (vbi)i∈Bm , C) as follows:
Bm := N , Gm := SMALL+, (vbi)i∈Bm where vbi(xi) =∑j uijxij,
C := {ci | ci = max{0, ai − ui(Bi)} where a = min{αµ˜, (1/α)µ˜}.
13 Find Aπ∗ = [A∗1 · · ·A∗n] := market equilibrium tree allocation // Solve Equation 3
14 if some agent received less than ci in A
π∗ then
15 continue // discard this allocation of BIG
16 else
17 for all {j | ∃i, 0 < xij < 1} // round off allocation of all shared goods j
18 do
19 for k ∈ N\{i} do
20 A∗k ← A∗k\[xkj ] // remove all allocations of j
21 For any i ∈ N : A∗i ← A∗i ∪ {j} // assign j to any agent i
22 Aπ = [A1, A2, · · · , An]← [A∗1, A∗2, · · · , A∗n]
23 if (M+\Aπ) 6= ∅ // there is an unallocated good
24 then
25 A1 = A1 ∪ (M+\Aπ) // can also assign remaining goods arbitrarily
26 Construct envy graph and eliminate all cycles
27 while (M−\Aπ) 6= ∅ // there is an unallocated chore
28 do
29 Add any unallocated chore to a sink agent
30 Update envy graph and eliminate cycles
31 if vi(Ai) ≥ min{(α − ǫ)µ˜i, (1/(α − ǫ))µ˜i} for all i then
32 for j ∈Mgc according to (vi)i∈N and i : j ∈ Ai // reallocate mixed items if
given to agents who consider them chores
33 do
34 if vij < 0 then
35 Ai ← Ai\{j}; For any i′ : vi′j > 0 : Ai′ ← Ai′ ∪ {j}
36 return Aπ
37 return "α-MMS allocation does not exist"
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4 Hardness of Approximation
Theorem 3.1 makes two assumptions on the GENERAL α-MMS problem with a mixed manna. First,
the number of agents is assumed to be a constant. Second, the total absolute valuation of every
agent for the goods is assumed to be at least (1 + τ) times the total valuation for chores (or vice
versa), for some constant τ . In this section we show that relaxing either of these two assumptions
makes the α-MMS problem NP-hard for any α ∈ (0, 1] even when agents are identical.
When agents are identical, the allocation that decides the MMS value of the agents is also an
MMS allocation for the instance. Thus, for α = 1, the GENERAL α-MMS problem should return
an MMS allocation. Furthermore, given v(M) > 0 we are guaranteed to have MMS ≥ 0 due to
Lemma 2.1. However next we show that when either assumption of problem α-MMS is dropped,
deciding if the inequality is indeed strict is NP-hard.
We show two NP-hardness results in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, stated in Section ?? and recalled
here, and both reduce from the known NP-hard PARTITION problem.
PARTITION Problem. Given a set of non-negative integers E = {e1, . . . , em}, output YES if there
exists a division of the elements into two sets of equal weight, otherwise output NO.
Theorem 4.1. Given an instance (N ,M, v) with constantly many (two) identical agents and
v(M) > 0, checking if MMS > 0 is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce an instance of PARTITION to an MMS instance (N ,M, v) with two identical
agents. Let N = {1, 2}. M = [m + 2], where the first m items are goods and the last two are
chores. The valuation function v is defined as follows, where β = 1/4.
vj =
{
ej , ∀ j ∈ [m]
−(∑i ei/2) + β, j ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2}.
That is, the goods correspond to PARTITION elements, and have the same value as the weight of
the element, and the chores are β more than the negated weight of each set in an equal distribution
of the elements. Note that, (a) the trivial partition where all items are in the same bundle has the
smaller bundle valued zero, and (b) the average of values of all items is β, and MMS cannot be
higher than the average (Lemma 2.2). Hence, 0 ≤ MMS ≤ β.
We prove the correctness of the reduction in the following two claims.
Claim 4.1. PARTITION has a solution ⇒ MMS ≥ β.
Proof. Divide the goods into two bundles as per the PARTITION solution, and add one chore to
each set. This gives us two bundles of equal value β, implying that MMS ≥ β.
Claim 4.2. MMS > 0⇒ PARTITION has a solution.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive by contradiction. Suppose PARTITION does not have a solution.
but MMS > 0 for the instance (N ,M, v). Let Aπ = (A1, A2) be the allocation achieving the MMS
value, and let u1 = v(A1) and u2 = v(A2). Then we have u1, u2 > 0.
First we prove that both the chores cannot be in the same bundle. If they are, and if all goods
are not in this bundle, then the value of the bundle with chores is at most the sum of all except the
smallest good. This is (−∑i ei + 2β) + (∑i ei −mini ei) ≤ 1/4 − 1 < 0. If every good and chore is
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in the same bundle, the value of the other bundle is 0. But v1 > 0, hence the chores are in separate
bundles.
But then the value of the goods in each bundle is at least the total value minus the chore’s
value, i.e., for i = 1, 2, v(Ai ∩M+) = ui − (−12
∑
i∈[m] ei + β) ≥ MMS− β + 12
∑
i ei >
1
2
∑
i ei − β.
Since β = 1/4 while v(Ai ∩M+) and 12
∑
i ei are integers, it follows that v(Ai ∩M+) ≥ 12
∑
i ei.
Then partition (A1 ∩M+, A2 ∩M+) of E = (e1, . . . , em) is a solution of the PARTITION problem,
a contradiction.
Claims 4.1 and 4.2 show that MMS > 0 ⇐⇒ there is a solution to PARTITION.
Remark 4.1. When v(M) < 0, a similar reduction shows the α-MMS problem is NP-Hard for
α ∈ (1/2, 1]. We swap the signs of all the partition elements, and add goods with value ∑j ej/2−β.
Then we show that MMS = −β if PARTITION has a solution, MMS = −2β otherwise. Hence, a
better than 2−approximate MMS allocation would be able to distinguish between the two cases.
When agents are identical, they agree on every item if it is a good or a chore, and therefore
Mgc = ∅. Therefore, v+i and v−i as defined in Definition 2.5 are same as v(M+) and |v(M−)|
respectively.
Theorem 4.2. Given a fixed constant τ > 0, even if instance (N ,M, v) with identical agents
satisfies v(M+) ≥ (1 + τ)|v(M−)|, checking if MMS > 0 is NP-hard.
Proof. Again, we give a reduction from PARTITION. Let E = {e1, e2, · · · , em} be the set of elements
given as input for PARTITION. Create an instance (N ,M, v) as follows: N has n agents, where n
will be fixed later based on the value of τ . M = {1, 2, · · · ,m+n} where the first m+(n− 2) items
are goods, and the last 2 are chores. The valuation function v is defined as follows, where β = 1/4.
vj =


ej ∀j ∈ [m]
β for j ∈ {m+ 1, ...,m + (n− 2)}
−∑i∈[m] ei/2 + β for j ∈ {m+ n− 1,m+ n}.
That is, the first m goods have values equal to the weights of the corresponding elements of
PARTITION. The remaining (n − 2) goods have value β each, and both the chores have value
−(∑i ei/2) + β. Fix n to satisfy v(M+) ≥ (1 + τ)|v(M−)| that is, ((n − 2)β + ∑i ei) ≥ (1 +
τ)(
∑
i ei + 2β).
We again have 0 ≤ MMS ≤ β. The lower bound because v(M) > 0 and Lemma 2.1, and the
upper bound because the average v(M)/n is β and Lemma 2.2. The correctness is argued in the
next two claims.
Claim 4.3. PARTITION has a solution ⇒ MMS ≥ β.
Proof. Divide the first m goods as per the division of the elements of PARTITION into equal valued
sets, and add one chore to each bundle. From the remaining goods {m+1, ...,m+(n−2)} give one
each to the remaining (n−2) bundles. The value of every bundle created is β. Hence, MMS ≥ β.
Claim 4.4. MMS > 0⇒ PARTITION has a solution.
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Proof. We prove the contrapositive of the statement, by contradiction. Suppose PARTITION in-
stance E = e1, . . . , em does not have a solution, but MMS > 0 for (N ,M, v).
Given that there are exactly two chores, at least (n − 2) bundles have only goods and has to
have at least one good. Furthermore, since eis are positive integers and β = 1/4, each of these
(n− 2) bundles have value at least β. Now, β being the upper bound on the MMS value, wlog we
can assume that these (n − 2) bundles have exactly one good of the minimum value, namely β.
This exhaust the goods {m + 1, . . . ,m+ (n − 2)} with value β. Therefore, the two chores and all
goods corresponding to the PARTITION problem elements, and no other good, are in the remaining
two bundles. Let these be the first two bundles A1 and A2.
Now by the same argument as in the proof of Claim 4.2, we can show that both A1 and A2
have positive value only if each contains exactly one chore and the total value of goods in each,
namely v(Ai ∩ E) for i = 1, 2, is at least 12
∑
i∈[m] ei. Thus, (A1 ∩ E,A2 ∩ E) is a solution to the
PARTITION instance E, a contradiction.
Claims 4.3 and 4.4 show that MMS > 0 for (N ,M, v) ⇐⇒ there is a solution to PARTITION.
Remark 4.2. If we change the relation of valuation of goods and chores to |v(M−)| ≥ (1 +
τ)v(M+), the α-MMS problem is NP-hard for α ∈ (1/2, 1]. A similar reduction as for Theorem 4.2
shows this. The modifications are we swap the signs of the PARTITION elements and corresponding
items, add two goods of value
∑
j ej/2 − β, and (n − 2) chores of value −β. We show MMS = −β
if PARTITION has a solution, and −2β otherwise.
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 show that even if we know that MMS ≥ 0 checking if it is strictly positive
is NP-hard. Since for α ∈ (0, 1], MMS > 0 ⇔ αMMS > 0, this essentially means, we can not find
an α-MMS allocation for any value of α ∈ (0, 1] if either of the two conditions in α-MMS problem
is dropped. The next theorem formalizes this.
Theorem 2.1. Given an instance (N ,M, v) with identical agents and v(M) > 0 such that one
of the following two holds: either |N | = 2 or v(M+) ≥ (1 + τ)|v(M−)| for a constant τ . Finding
α-MMS allocation of (N ,M, v) for any α ∈ (0, 1] is NP-hard.
Even though an instance with identical agents is guaranteed to have an allocation where every
agent gets at least the MMS value, i.e., 1-MMS allocation exists, Theorem 2.1 ruling out efficient
algorithm for finding α-MMS allocation any α ∈ (0, 1] is very striking. In light of this result, it is
evident that even getting a PTAS, in other words finding (1−ǫ)-MMS allocation, in case of identical
agents is non-trivial and important. In the next section, we resolve this for the α-MMS problem.
5 PTAS for α-MMS with Identical Agents
We discuss the α-MMS problem for identical agents in this section. Note that an exact MMS
allocation always exists for this case. Also, as agents are identical, they have the same MMS values.
From Lemma 2.1, finding the sign of these values is easy. Hence, we describe two algorithms, one
for each case, when MMS ≥ 0 and otherwise. In this section, we describe a PTAS for the case with
non-negative MMS values. The PTAS for the other case is similar, and is discussed in Appendix B.
Specifically, we describe an algorithm that finds a (1 − ǫ)-approximate MMS allocation for
agents with non-negative MMS values, for any constant ǫ > 0. This algorithm will be used as a
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subroutine in the α-MMS problem with non-identical agents for finding the MMS value of every
agent approximately within any constant factor.
Note that the α-MMS problem is scale invariant. Therefore, without loss of generality, here on
we assume v(M) = n = |N |. Due to Lemma 2.2, this also implies MMS ≤ v(M)/n = 1. Also, since
valuations are identical Mgc = ∅.
Definition 5.1. For an instance (N ,M, v) with identical agents and constant ǫ > 0, let Big be the
set of items in M which have absolute value bigger than ǫ2 , i.e.,
Big = {j ∈M : |vj | ≥ ǫ2}.
Let Big+ and Big− be respectively the sets of big goods and big chores inM, i.e., Big+ = Big∩M+,
and Big− = Big ∩M−. Let Small be the set of small items, M \ Big, and similarly define small
goods (Small+) and small chores (Small−).
We abuse notation slightly and call items in the set Big (or Small) as Big (resp. Small) items.
We use a bag filling algorithm discussed next in our final PTAS (Algorithm 4).
5.1 A Bag-Filling Algorithm
In this section we design a bag-filling algorithm that generalizes algorithms in [GHS+18, GMT18,
GT20] to the mixed setting.
Our algorithm (Algorithm 3) takes as input an MMS instance (N ,M, v), and a partition of
the Big items of M into n bags, denoted by Bπ = [B1, B2, . . . , Bn] such that they satisfy one of
the following two condition sets. And it outputs an allocation of items Aπ = [A1, . . . , An] where
v(Ai) ≥ 1− ǫ, for all i ∈ [n].
v(Small) +
n∑
k=1
v(Bk) ≥ n.
v(Bk) ≤ 1 ∀k ∈ [n].
|vj | < ǫ ∀j ∈ Small.
(11)
v(Small) +
n∑
k=1
v(Bk) ≥ n(1− ǫ2).
v(Bk) ≤ 1− ǫ2 ∀k ∈ [n].
|vj | < ǫ2 ∀j ∈ Small.
(12)
Next we explain the algorithm: Algorithm 3 has n − 1 rounds. Each round starts with a
bag/bundle from B. If the bag is valued at least (1− ǫ), then it is assigned to some agent. If not,
first we add all unallocated Small chores to this bag. Then one by one we add unallocated goods
from Small until it is valued at least (1 − ǫ). This bag is then assigned to some agent, and the
current round ends. After all rounds are done, in the last step, all remaining items from Small are
added to the bag Bn.
Next we prove the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 5.1. If an MMS instance with identical agents satisfies condition set (11) or (12), then
Algorithm 3 gives a (1− ǫ)-Allocation.
Proof. First, we prove the claim for condition set (11). By induction on k ∈ [n− 1], we prove that
the value of each assigned bundle after k rounds is in [1 − ǫ, 1]. Assume the value of all bundles
assigned to the first k − 1 agents are in this range. Now v(Bj) ≤ 1 for all j ∈ {k, .., n}. If
v(Bk) ≥ 1 − ǫ, we are done. If not, then while the value of Bk is less than 1 − ǫ, the value of
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Algorithm 3: Bag-filling to find (1− ǫ)-MMS Allocation for identical agents
Input : (N ,M, v), Partition of Big ⊆M: Bπ = [B1, B2, . . . , Bn]. Input satisfies Condition
set (11) or (12)
Output: Aπ = {A1, . . . , An} such that v(Ai) ≥ 1− ǫ, ∀i ∈ [n].
1 Aπ ← ∅, Small ←M\Big
2 for k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} do
3 while v(Bk) < 1− ǫ do
4 j ← argminj∈Small vj
5 Bk ← Bk ∪ {j},Small ← Small \ {j}
6 Aπ ← Aπ ∪ {Bk}
7 Bn ← Bn ∪ Small, Aπ ← Aπ ∪ {Bn}
8 return A
the unallocated items from Small is at least the value of all items minus that of all the allocated
bundles and unallocated bags of Big items. This can be bounded as,
v(M)−
∑
i<k
v(Ai)− v(Bk)−
∑
i>k
v(Bi) > n− (k − 1)− (1− ǫ)− (n− k) > ǫ.
Hence, there is at least one unallocated Small good. Before adding the last Small good to Ak, its
value was strictly less than 1− ǫ. Adding the last item increases the value by at most ǫ. Hence, the
value of Ak is at most 1. Thus, v(Ak) ∈ [1− ǫ, 1], for all k ∈ [n− 1]. As the total value of all items
is at least n, and the total value of the n− 1 assigned bundles is at most n− 1, the last agent also
gets a bundle of value at least 1.
Similarly, if the instance satisfies condition set (12), we can prove by induction that after
k ∈ [n − 1] rounds, all assigned bundles have value in [1 − ǫ, 1 − ǫ/2]. In every round, while this
is not true, the value of unallocated goods is at least ǫ/2. Thus, there is at least one Small good.
Finally, after assigning n−1 bundles, the total value remaining is at least n(1−ǫ/2)−(n−1)(1−ǫ/2),
hence the last bundle also has value at least (1− ǫ).
5.2 The PTAS
In this section we design an algorithm, namely Algorithm 4, to find (1 − ǫ)-MMS allocation for
instance (N ,M, v) when it satisfies conditions of Definition 2.5. We first discuss two crucial prop-
erties of MMS allocations that provide the main intuition behind the algorithm.
Suppose we find an allocation for a subset of agents N ′ where everyone in N ′ gets at least
(1− ǫ). Since the remaining agents are identical, an MMS allocation exists for the smaller instance
with the remaining agents and the remaining items too. Now suppose the MMS value of the smaller
instance was equal or higher than that of the original instance. Then a (1− ǫ)-MMS allocation of
the smaller instance, combined with the allocation of the agents in N ′, would be a (1 − ǫ)-MMS
allocation overall.
We describe a sub-case of the problem where we can use this intuition. Denote partitions of
Big items into n bundles by Bπ = {B1, B2 · · · , Bn}. Classify the bundles based on their value, into
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sets B1, B2, B3, and B4 as follows.
B1 := {Bk ∈ Bπ : v(Bk) > 1}
B2 := {Bk ∈ Bπ : 1− ǫ ≤ v(Bk) ≤ 1}
B3 := {Bk ∈ Bπ : 0 ≤ v(Bk) < 1− ǫ}
B4 := {Bk ∈ Bπ : v(Bk) < 0}
(13)
Let Aπ∗ be some MMS allocation, and Bπ∗ = {B∗1 , B∗2 , · · · , B∗n} be the allocation of Big items
according to Aπ∗. We prove that if B4 is empty for Bπ∗, then by assigning the bundles B1 and B2
to the corresponding agents, the MMS values of the remaining agents for the remaining items does
not decrease.
Lemma 5.2. If Bπ∗ has |B4| = 0 and all SMALL chores can be added to bundles in B1 without
reducing their value to less than 1− ǫ, then,
MMSn(M) ≤p MMSn−|B1|−|B2|(
⋃
B∈B3
B ∪ Small+) .
Proof. Consider the allocation of Small items in Aπ∗. Allocate items in M′ = ∪B∈B3B ∪ Small+
among the set of agents who have received bundles in B3, say N ′, as they are allocated in Aπ∗. Call
this allocation Aπ ′. Now the allocation Aπ∗ may also have some Small chores assigned to agents in
N ′, but no other goods. The lowest valued bundle in Aπ ′ thus has value at least that of the lowest
valued bundle in Aπ∗ (since no SMALL chore is added to these bundles in Aπ ′). The MMS value
of agents in N ′, when partitioning M′ among them, is at least that of the lowest valued bundle of
Aπ ′, hence is at least MMSn(M).
Lemma 5.2 implies that if we are given Bπ∗ where B4 is empty and all SMALL chores can be
exhausted by adding them to bundles in B1 while their value remains at least 1− ǫ, we can allocate
B1 and B2 to the corresponding agents, and reduce the problem to the smaller instance with the
remaining agents and items. The lemma assumes we know Bπ∗. One way to get the right Bπ∗ is
to enumerate all possible partitions of Big, and somehow optimally allocate Small items over these.
But there could be wrong partitions that cannot apply the algorithm that allocates the Small items.
The next property of MMS allocations helps to identify one such type of wrong partitions of Big.
Lemma 5.3. For a partition Bπ of Big items, suppose sets B1,B2,B3,B4 defined in (13) satisfy
the following three conditions:
(a) B1 is non-empty and Small− = ∅
(b) |B4| > 0
(c) v(B3 ∪ B4 ∪ Small+) < (1− ǫ2)(|B3|+ |B4|).
Then either Bπ is not a partition of the Big items in any MMS allocation, or there exists another
MMS where the allocation of big items has strictly smaller value for (|B1|+ |B4|).
Proof. Let Bπ∗ be the partition of big items in an MMS allocation that has lowest (|B1| + |B4|).
And to the contrary suppose B∗ also satisfy all the three conditions of (a), (b) and (c). Then
µ∗ = MMS < (1− ǫ2), because the total valuation is v(B3 ∪ B4 ∪ Small+) < (1− ǫ2)(|B3|+ |B4|).
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Take any bundle B from B1 that has v(B) > 1. Let v(B) = (1 + x) for some x > 0. Take B′
from B4 with v(B′) = −y for some y > 0. In an MMS allocation, B′ must be bundled with a set of
Small goods of value at least y + µ∗.
We make two new bundles using B, B′ and the Small goods added to B′ in the MMS allocation.
First merge B and B′ into one bundle (with value 1+x−y) and have no items in the other bundle.
If 1 + x − y < µ∗, start adding the Small goods one by one to a bundle that has a lower value
at each time. Let A1 and A2 be the resulting bundles after adding the Small goods. Without loss
of generality, let v(A1) ≥ v(A2). We have
v(A1) + v(A2) ≥ 1 + x− y + y + µ∗ = 1 + x+ µ∗ and v(A1)− v(A2) ≤ ǫ2
=⇒ v(A2) ≥ 12(1 + x+ µ∗ − ǫ2) > 12(1 + µ∗ − ǫ2 ) > µ∗ =⇒ v(A1) > µ∗.
The second inequality holds because each Small good has value at most ǫ2 and Small goods are
always added to the lower valued bundle.
If 1 + x − y > µ∗, add all remaining Small goods to the empty bundle and now each bundle
values at least µ∗.
Depending on the value of 1+ x− y, we removed one bundle from either B1 and/or one bundle
from B4, without reducing the value of the lowest valued bundle in the allocation. Therefore, either
Bπ∗ is not the partition of Big items in an MMS allocation, or there exists another MMS allocation
where the partition of big items is such that corresponding (|B1| + |B4|) is strictly smaller. A
contradiction.
Remark 5.1. The statement and the proof of the Lemma 5.3 hold even if Small− was non-empty
initially, but all the Small chores can be allocated so that the conditions hold after their allocation.
Particularly, we add chores to bundles in B1 while maintaining the value of bundles to be at least
1− ǫ. If, all chores are exhausted but there are still bundles with value more than 1, we update the
definitions in (13) and then we use the lemma.
Lemma 5.3 gives us the condition when a partition of Big can be safely discarded. Using this,
the high-level idea for Algorithm 4 is as follows: Let the set of all partitions of Big into n bundles be
denoted by Πn(Big). For each allocation Bπ ∈ Πn(Big), algorithm either ends up with an allocation
Aπ of all the items, or discards Bπ because the conditions of Lemma 5.3 are satisfied. If we are
sure that allocation Aπ will give every agent a bundle of value at least (1− ǫ), then Aπ is returned
as an output, otherwise it is stored in a list A of allocations. In the end, we return the allocation
with the highest maximin value from A. The former case automatically ensures a (1 − ǫ)-MMS
allocation, since MMS ≤ 1. On the other hand, when MMS << 1, we show that the later case still
manages to guarantee a (1− ǫ)-MMS valued bundle to everyone.
We are now ready to discuss the algorithm and its analysis formally.
Algorithm description. The main for loop in Algorithm 4 considers every partition Bπ of the
Big items. For each partition Bπ, it first classifies the bundles into the sets B1, B2, B3, and B4 as
defined in (13).
If B1 is not empty, then add the Small chores to each bag in B1 until the bag has value at most
1. This process ends either when all bundles in B1 now have value at most 1, or all Small chores
are exhausted. In the first case, condition set (11) is satisfied and we run the bag-filling algorithm
3 (Line 10).
In the latter case, when all Small chores are exhausted but there are one or more bundles with
value more than 1, consider the set B4. If |B4| = 0, then reduce to a simpler α-MMS problem
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Algorithm 4: (1− ǫ)-MMS Allocation for Identical Agents
Input : (N ,M, v) such that v(M) = n, ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
Output: (1− ǫ)-MMS Allocation
1 A← ∅. Πn(Big)← all partitions of Big into n sets.
2 for Bπ ∈ Πn(Big) do
3 Define B1,B2,B3,B4 as in (13).
4 while B1 6= ∅ and Small− 6= ∅ do
5 j ← any unallocated chore , Small− ← Small− \ {j}
6 for any B ∈ B1 : B ← B ∪ {j}, // add a small chore to any bundle in B1
7 if v(B) ≤ 1 then
8 B1 ← B1\B, B2 ← B2 ∪B
9 if B1 = ∅ then
10 Aπ ← Bag-Fill((N ,M, v), (Bi ∈ B2 ∪ B3 ∪ B4))
11 return Aπ
12 else if |B4| > 0 then
13 Aπ ← (B1 ∪ B2), N ′ ← agents who received B3 ∪ B4, M′ ← B3 ∪ B4 ∪ Small+,
n′ ← |B3|+ |B4|
14 if v(M′) ≥ n′(1− ǫ2) then
15 Aπ ← Aπ ∪ Bag-Fill((N ′ ,M′, v), (Bi)i∈N ′)
16 return Aπ
17 else
18 continue // conditions of Lemma 5.3 are met so discard Bπ.
19 else
20 N ′ ← agents who received B3 ∪ B4, M′ ← Small+, ∀j ∈M′, v′j = vj.
21 for B ∈ B3 do
22 introduce a new good b with v′b = v(B)
23 M ′ ←M′ ∪ {b}
24 Aπ ← B1 ∪ B2 ∪ (1− ǫ)-MMS allocation for (N ′,M′, v′) using the algorithm in
[Woe97] // goods-only setting
25 A← A ∪ {Aπ}
26 return argmaxApi∈AminAi∈Api v(Ai)
(N ′,M′, v′) in a goods only setting, defined as follows. N ′ is the set of agents who received bundles
from B3 or B4. The item set M′ contains all the Small goods with same value in v′ as in v, and
for each bundle B ∈ B3 it has a new item b with value v′b = v(B). Run the PTAS from [Woe97] on
(N ′,M′, v′) to find a (1−ǫ)-MMS allocation of these goods among the remaining n′ = n−(|B1|+|B2|)
agents, and return its output.
For the final case when B1 6= ∅ and |B4| > 0, first check if the remaining unallocated goods and
agents in B3 ∪B4 fulfill the condition set 12. If they do, apply the bag-filling algorithm and return
the (1 − ǫ)-MMS allocation. If not, then conditions of Lemma 5.3 are satisfied so discard Bπ and
proceed to the next allocation of Big items. At the end of for loop, if no output allocation was
returned and Bπ was not discarded, then it stores the final allocation Aπ in A. Finally, once done
with the for loop it returns the best allocation from set A,
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Analysis
Lemma 5.4. |Big| = O(n/ǫ).
Proof. As the sum of values of all items is n, we have n = v(M+)− |v(M−)|. Then, as v(M+) ≥
(1 + τ)|v(M−)|,
n ≥ v(M+)− v(M
+)
1 + τ
=⇒ v(M+) ≤ n(1 + τ)
τ
. (14)
Finally, by the definition of Big+ we have
|Big+| ≤ v(M
+)
ǫ
2
≤ 2n(1 + τ)
ǫτ
.
Similarly, we have
n ≥ (1 + τ)|v(M−)| − |v(M−)| ⇒ |v(M−)| ≤ n/τ. (15)
Thus, the number of Big chores is bounded as |Big−| ≤ 2nǫτ . As τ is constant, |Big+| and |Big−| are
O(n/ǫ). Hence, |Big| = |Big+ ∪ Big−| = O(n/ǫ).
As n and ǫ are also constant, and partitioning a constantly many items into constantly many
sets take constant time, we get the following as a corollary of Lemma 5.4.
Corollary 5.1. The set of all possible allocations of Big items, namely Πn(Big), can found in
constant time, and the main for loop of Algorithm 4 runs constantly many times.
Next we state and prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.1. Given an MMS instance (N ,M, v) with identical agents, Algorithm 4 returns a
(1− ǫ)-MMS allocation in f(n, 1ǫ2 )O(logm) + f ′(n, 1ǫ )O(m) time.
Proof. First, we prove the correctness of the algorithm. Consider an iteration of the for loop for
partition Bπ ∈ Πn(Big) of Big items, and corresponding sets B1,B2,B3 and B4 as defined in (13).
If both B1 and Small− are non-empty, then the algorithm adds Small chores one by one to any
B1 bundle, until the value of the bundle falls below 1. Note that as every Small chore has absolute
value at most ǫ/2, upon adding the last chore before the value falls below 1, the value of every
modified B1 bundle is still at least 1− ǫ/2, hence it is now a B2 bundle.
If all B1 bundles get modified to a B2 bundle in this process, that is if B1 is empty, then condition
set (11) holds for B2 ∪ B3 ∪ B4 bundles. Lemma 5.1 implies all agents get a (1 − ǫ) valued bundle
which is a (1− ǫ)-MMS allocation.
When B1 6= ∅, and Small− = ∅, the algorithm next checks if B4 is empty or not. Suppose B4 is
not empty. If the condition set (12) holds for agents corresponding to bundles in B3 and B4 for the
items not in B1 and B2, then Lemma 5.1 implies the bag-filling algorithm 3 gives them a (1 − ǫ)
valued bundle. After allocating the B1 and B2 bundles to the respective agents and combining with
the result of the bag-filling algorithm, we get a (1− ǫ)-MMS allocation.
If B4 is not empty and the condition set (12) does not hold for the agents corresponding to
B3∪B4, then all three conditions of Lemma 5.3 holds for (modified) Bπ (after adding Small chores)
implying that it is safe to discard Bπ.
If B4 is empty, Lemma 5.2 proves the Algorithm returns a (1−ǫ)-MMS allocation if the partition
of Big being examined is the optimal partition Bπ∗. The set A stores all the resulting allocations,
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and hence it also contains the allocation corresponding to Bπ∗. The allocation that gives the highest
maximin value must correspond to Bπ∗. Hence, Algorithm 4 returns a (1− ǫ)-MMS allocation here
too.
For running time, note that every iteration of the for loop first allocates all Small chores,
then either runs a bag-filling algorithm, which takes O(m) time, discards the iteration, or runs
the PTAS of [Woe97] which takes O(21/ǫ
2
n logm) time. In the worst case, every iteration takes
O(m + O(21/ǫ
2
n logm)) time. The for loop runs for n|BIG| iterations, which from Lemma 5.4 is
O(nn/ǫ) = 2O(n logn/ǫ). Hence, the total run time of the algorithm is O(2n logn/ǫ(21/ǫ
2
n logm+m)) =
f(n, 1ǫ2 )O(logm) + f
′(n, 1ǫ )O(m) time.
6 Related Work
The first study of fair division was a cake cutting problem [Ste48]. Two of most well known notions
of fairness are proportionality, where each agent gets a bundle which worth at least 1/n (n = |N |)
of her value for all items, and envy-freeness, where each agent values her own bundle at least as
much as other agents’. However, when items inM are indivisible, proportionality and envy-freeness
cannot always be attained. A simple example is allocating a single good between two agents; there
is no allocation that is proportional or envy-free. This motivated the search for new notions of
fairness for indivisible items.
MMS for Goods. Budish defined the maximin share (MMS) allocation for allocating indivisible
items in a fair manner [Bud11]. In recent years, MMS has attracted a lot of interest [AMNS17,
BKM17, BL16, FGH+19, GMT18, GHS+18, KPW16, PW14, KPW18, GT20]. Bouveret and
Lemaître [BL16] showed that in some restricted cases MMS allocation always exists. In a notable
result, Procaccia and Wang [PW14] showed that MMS allocation might not always exist but 2/3-
MMS allocation, where each agent receives at least 2/3 of her MMS value always exists. A series of
works studied efficient computation of 2/3-MMS allocations for any n [AMNS17, BKM17, GMT18].
Ghodsi et al. [GHS+18] showed that 3/4-MMS allocation always exists. Most recently, Garg and
Taki [GT20] showed that (3/4 + 1/(12n))-MMS allocation always exists.
Finding MMS value is hard but a PTAS exists [Woe97]. This PTAS can be used to find (3/4 +
1/(12n) − ǫ)-MMS allocation for ǫ > 0 in polynomial time. Also, there is a strongly polynomial
time algorithm to find 3/4-MMS allocation [GT20].
Constant number of agents For three agents, [AMNS17] showed that a 7/8-MMS allocation
always exists. This factor was later improved to 8/9 in [GM19]. For four agents, [GHS+18] showed
that a 4/5-MMS allocation always exist.
In all these works it has been assumed that items have non-negative valuations, i.e, M consists
of all goods. However, there has been impressive series of works for the case when M is consist of
all chores.
MMS for Chores. The problem of MMS allocation for chores was studied for the first time by
Aziz et al [ARSW17], where they introduced an algorithm for 2-MMS allocation3. Barman et al.
3We later introduce a general notion for α-MMS allocation that is for mixed items where α < 1. It is consistent
for agents with positive as well as negative MMS value. Here, to keep the original results of the works, we state the
approximation factor as the same as the definition of the original paper.
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[BKM17] improved the previous result by showing an algorithm for 4/3-MMS allocation. Later,
Huang and Lu [HL19] improved this result and showed an algorithm to obtain 11/9-MMS allocation.
They also show a PTAS to find (11/9+ ǫ)-MMS allocation and a polynomial time algorithm to find
a 5/4-MMS allocation.
Other variants of MMS. The MMS problem has been studied under various other models in
the goods only setting like with asymmetric agents [FGH+19], group fairness [BBKN18, CKMS20],
beyond additive valuations [BKM17, GHS+18, LV18], in matroids [GM19], with additional con-
straints [GM19, BB18],for agents with externalities [BMR+, AEG+13], with graph constraints [BILS19,
LT19], and with strategic agents [BGJ+19]. IN the chores only setting too, weighted MMS [ACL19],
and asymmetric agents [ACL] notions have been investigated.
Fairness for Mixed Items Finding fair allocations of mixed items has recently caught a lot of
attention for both divisible [BMSY17, BMSY19] and indivisible [ACIW19, AW19, AW20, Ale20,
GM20], items. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study on MMS allocations
for mixed items.
Other Fairness Notions There are other notions of fairness, beside MMS, for indivisible items.
Here, we introduced the most notable work on these notions for good only setting.
EF1. This notion was first introduced by [Bud11] which is a relaxation of envy-free allocation.
An allocation is EF1 if for any two agents i1 and i2, agent i1 prefers (or equally likes) her own bundle
to agent i2’s bundle after removing some item from the bundle of agent i2. An EF1 allocation can
be found efficiently using envy cycle removal procedure introduced by [LMMS].
EFX. Envy free up to any good (EFX) is a stronger relaxation of envy-free allocation which
was first introduced by [CKM+16]. An allocation is EFX if for any two agents i1 and i2, agent
i1 prefers (or equally likes) her own bundle to agent i2’s bundle after removing any item from the
bundle of agent i2. Plaut and Roughgarden [PR] showed the existence of EFX allocation for two
restricted cases 1) when n = 2 and 2) when agents are identical. Until recently, the existence of an
EFX allocation was unknown even for 3 agents. Chaudhury et al. [CGM20a], showed that for three
agents EFX allocation always exist. The partial EFX allocation and approximate EFX allocation
has also been vastly studied [CGH, CKMS20].
NSW. Nash Social Welfare (NSW) is the geometric mean of the valuation of the agents. The
NSW problem is to find an allocation of indivisible items that maximizes NSW. Even though this
notion is not applicable for mixed-manna, it is a popular notion of fairness in the goods only setting.
The problem is APX-Hard [MG20], and remarkable approximation results for the linear valuations
case have been proven by a connection of the problem with markets [CG, CDG+, BKV18, CCG+18]
or real stable polynomials [AGSS17]. The best known result is a 1.45 approximation factor [BKV18].
Similar results are known, again by exploiting the market connection, for popular valuation func-
tions like budget-additive [GHM19], separable piece-wise linear concave (SPLC) [AMGV], and their
combination [CCG+18]. Recent results give an O(n) approximation when agents have subadditive
valuations, a far more general class than all the earlier ones [BBKS20, CGM20b]. Recent work has
also been done on the general version of the problem with asymmetric agents, where the aim is to
maximize the weighted geometric mean, for given weights, and submodular utilities [GKK20].
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7 Discussion
For the OPT-α-MMS problem, we obtain a PTAS for mixed manna when the number of agents is
a constant, and for every agent her total value for goods differ significantly from her total absolute
value for chores. As a corollary we get a PTAS for goods only manna with constant number of
agents. It would be interesting to see if the tools we develop can be used to get PTAS to solve
OPT-α-MMS for the good manna with non-constant number of agents. Similarly, for bad manna.
A second immediate direction is to study what happens when the valuation functions are more
general than additive. For instance, the MMS problem for a mixed manna with submodular valua-
tion functions is interesting. Finally, connecting market equilibria to MMS is a new relation. Like
for the Nash social welfare problem, this relation could be exploited to solve other questions.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Prof. Jugal Garg for several valuable discussions.
A PTAS for α-MMS of identical agents with negative MMS value
In this section we introduce an Algorithm to find (1 − ǫ)-MMS allocation for ǫ > 0 and identical
agents when MMS < 0 (Algorithm 5). It is shown in Lemma 2.1 that it is easy to check whether
MMS < 0. From Definition 2.3, a (1 − ǫ)-MMS allocation gives each agent a bundle with value at
least (1/(1 − ǫ))MMS.
In Algorithm 5, first, we define σ := 11−ǫ − 1. The algorithm obtains an allocation in which
each agent gets a bundle with value at least (1 + σ)MMSi = (1/(1 − ǫ))MMSi . First we scale
the valuations so that v(M) = −n. Same as in Algorithm 4, we then enumerate over all possible
allocations of big items. While there are unallocated Small goods, we add them one by one to the
bundle with the least value. Once all Small goods are exhausted, we iteratively add Small chores
to the bundle with the highest value.
Algorithm 5: (1− ǫ)-MMS Allocation for identical agents with negative MMS value
Input : (N ,M, (vi)i∈N ), where v ∈ (vi)i∈N are the same, a constant ǫ
Output: (1− ǫ)-MMS Allocation
1 σ ← 11−ǫ − 1
2 Normalize the valuations so that v(M) = −n.
3 X ←M, A ← ∅
4 Big := {j ∈ X : |vj | ≥ σ}, Small :=M\Big, Small+ = Small ∩M+,Small− = Small ∩M−
5 for B ∈ Πn(Big) do
6 while Small+ 6= ∅ do
7 for any Small good j: X ← X \ {j}, B ← argminBk∈B v(Bk)
8 B ← B ∪ {j} // add a small good to the bundle with lowest value
9 while X 6= ∅ do
10 for any Small chore j, X ← X \ {j}, B ← argmaxBk∈B v(Bk)
11 B ← B ∪ {j} // add a small chore to the bundle with highest value
12 A ← A∪ {B}
13 return argmaxA∈AminAi∈A v(Ai)
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Remark A.1. Since v(M) = −n, we can conclude that MMSi ≤ −1.
Theorem A.1. Algorithm 5 gives (1− ǫ)-MMS allocation.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction. First, Let Bπ∗ be a partition of big items in an
MMS allocation. We have
v(Small+) ≥
∑
B∈Bpi∗:v(B)<MMSi
MMSi − v(Bπ∗) . (16)
Now, let Aπ = {A1, . . . , An} be the output of Algorithm 5. If there exist Ak ∈ A such that
v(Ak) < ( 11−ǫ)MMSi = (1 + σ)MMSi. Consider each Ak ⊇ Bk with v(Bk) < MMSi. Before adding
the last Small good, the value of this bundle is less than (1 + σ)MMSi (because the algorithm adds
goods to the bundle with least value). The last good added to these bundles value at most σ.
Therefore, all such Ak’s value at most MMSi. From, (17) and the fact that algorithm adds goods
to the least valued bundle, we have
v(Small+ \ (
⋃
k∈[n]
Ak)) ≥
∑
B∈Bpi∗:v(B)<MMSi
MMSi − v(B) + σ = σ (17)
which is a contradiction.
Now we prove that after adding the Small chores the value of all bundles remains at least
(1 + σ)MMSi. This is true because while there exists an unallocated chore, the value of the most
valued bundle is greater than−1 (because v(M) = −n). Adding a chore to such bundle will decrease
the value by at most σ. Therefore, the value of such bundle is at least −(1 + σ) ≥ (1 + σ)MMSi.
By definition of σ, (1 + σ) = 1/(1− ǫ).
B Missing proofs
We will use the following in the proof of Lemma B.1. The ratio of the valuation of an agent for
a good to its price is called its bang-per-buck value for the agent. From [BGHM17], in a market
equilibrium, every buyer only buys goods that give her the highest bang-per-buck value among all
goods, that is belong in what is called her maximum bang-per-buck (MBB) set. Denote the MBB
value of buyer i by λi.
Lemma B.1. All cycles in the market equilibrium allocation graph defined in Section 3.2 can be
eliminated efficiently to get a new equilibrium whose allocation graph is acyclic.
Proof. To prove this lemma, assume the allocation graph is not acyclic. We first show how to
eliminate one cycle in the graph, so that the resulting allocation is also a market equilibrium.
Denote the cycle by [il, jl]l∈[k] = {i1, j1, i2, j2, · · · , ik, jk, i1}, where il are buyers and jl are goods.
That is, buyer i1 has non zero amounts of goods j1 and jk, and every other buyer il, l ∈ [k]\{1} has
non zero amount of goods jl−1 and jl. Add weights to this cycle graph, where weight of edge (i, j)
is the amount of money spent by buyer i on good j, denoted by wij. Then consider the edge (i, j)
that has the minimum weight, i.e., (i, j) = argmini,j∈[k]wij . Without loss of generality, suppose
this edge is (i1, j1), and the minimum weight is w.
Change the weights of the edges as follows. For buyer i1, reduce the weight of edge (i1, j1) to 0,
and increase weight of (i1, jk) by w. For every other buyer ia, increase the weight of edge (ia, ja−1)
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by w, and decrease the weight of (ia, ja) by w. That is, on alternate edges of the cycle, we increase
and decrease weights by w.
Let the money spent by each buyer on the goods along the cycle be changed to the edge weight
of this new graph. As every good and buyer has w amount reduced on one neighbor and the same
increased on the other, the money spent on every good, and that spent by every buyer, is the
same. Also change the allocations of goods so that buyers receive the fraction of goods worth the
(changed) money they spend on them. Note that agent i1 now spends no money on j1, hence the
allocation graph does not have this edge, nor the cycle [il, jl]l∈[k].
Now for each buyer, her neighbor goods in the cycle are in her MBB set. Hence, for each buyer
ia, her change in total valuation is the added value from ja−1 and reduced value from ja. This is
given by λiaw − λiaw = 0, as both ja−1 and ja are in her MBB set. Hence, the total valuation of
every buyer remains the same.
In summary, for the same set of prices and the new allocation after removing one cycle, the
total valuation of every buyer, the money spent by every buyer and the money spent on every good
remains the same in the new allocation. Also, every buyer still buys goods only from her MBB set.
Hence, the new allocation is an equilibrium allocation for the same set of prices.
We can similarly eliminate all cycles in the allocation graph. After every cycle elimination, we
remove one edge. Hence, in at most O(mn) time, we can make the graph acyclic.
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